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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the missing link in the literature – whether informal institutions, or what 
is known as culture, can affect the level of financial development for a country? Our hypothesis 
stresses that the cultural dimensions of a country can have an impact on its financial set up. We 
consider multiple dimensions of culture, identified in the literature by Tabellini, to test our 
hypothesis. As culture evolve in the form of greater trust, control and other traits, individuals‟ 
attitudes towards financial market change, and they engage in greater financial transactions. 
This, in turn, leads to better financial development. Using quantile estimation technique for a 
cross-section of 90 countries we find that culture significantly influences the level of financial 
development. To ensure the robustness of our findings we use Hofstede‟s cultural dimension-
„uncertainty avoidance index‟ as an alternative measure for culture. Our results hold for multiple 
measures of financial development. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A broad literature has investigated the determinants of financial development for a country. 
There is a general consensus among the economists that the financial development of a country 
is positively correlated with its overall growth and other aspects of its economic development.  
For instance, among several impacts, financial development increases the likelihood of making 
foreign aid work and enables the nation to create comparative advantage in manufacturing 
industries (Beck, 2003). According to Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000), financial 
development indicators measure the size, activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and 
markets.  
Though many theories
1
 have been put forward as to why countries differ in their levels of 
financial development, no literature has investigated whether indigenous culture, a form of 
informal institutions, can have an impact on the same. The working definition of culture as 
advocated by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) identifies it with “those customary beliefs and 
values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to 
generation”.  One of the most used approaches to test the relationship between culture and 
economic outcomes is to draw on survey-based evidence and to measure culture directly, based 
on beliefs or attitudes expressed by individuals on a series of issues. This is done, for instance, in 
explaining the persistence of inefficient institutions, or willingness to trust and to cooperate with 
others (Tabellini, 2008, 2009), and the formation of social capital (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 
                                                          
1
There are many explanations as to what generates investor protection which, in turn, aids the formation of efficient 
financial infrastructure. La Porta et al (1998) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) claim that legal origin is 
key to investor protection and, thus, to financial development. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that the relative 
merits of domestic financial intermediation are a function of the contractibility of the environment and the relative 
value of price signals.    He also claims special interest groups have strong incentives to block the development of a 
transparent and competitive financial sector of a closed economy. According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001), colonial origins determined earlier institutional structure and are the sole factors that matter for an efficient 
financial system.  Stulz and Williamson (2003) noted that countries‟ principal religion predicts the cross country 
differences in creditor rights. 
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2006. Tabellini (2008) measures culture as an aggregate index that incorporates four different 
components of a society: trust, self-determination, respect, and obedience
2
.Trust, indicates to 
what extent individuals trust a broader group of people versus a narrower group. Thus, it is quite 
reasonable to assume that the more an individual trusts the society in general, the more she 
would be prone to engage in financial transactions and will have greater faith in banking sector, 
stock market and other financial sectors. The existing literature emphasizes that greater levels of 
trust are associated with a higher growth and development (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et 
al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). The other trait, „Control‟3, should also impact the level of 
financial development. As individuals gain more control of their life, they will strive to gain 
more control of their financial situation as well and will be willing to channelize savings and 
investment accordingly.  Finally, „Obedience‟ has been identified as a negative trait. Increased 
„Obedience‟ implies less risk taking behavior (Harper, 2003), which, in turn, implies investment 
in risk-averse transactions.  Consequently, greater obedience may have a negative and 
detrimental impact on financial development.   
We aim to provide an empirical analysis of the impact of culture on financial 
development. In doing so, we hypothesize that a higher score of culture leads to better financial 
development.   Our results confirm our hypothesis. We rely on cross sectional quantile regression 
methodology given the sticky nature of the culture variable as well as to account for the bias 
resulting from the presence of outliers. Also, culture will tend to have a long-term influence on 
economic variables. Considering yet another cultural dimension - Hofstede‟s uncertainty 
                                                          
2
 The appendix talks in detail about the construction of the „culture‟ variable 
3
 As explained later, Tabellini (2008) identified four traits of culture – Trust, Respect, Control and Obedience. If the 
individuals feel they have the „Control‟ in determining their actions they will be more likely to innovate, invest in 
the future, and work more diligently (Tabellini 2009; Coyne and Williamson 2009). 
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avoidance (UA) – our results show that a higher UA index is associated with lower scores of 
financial development.  Section 2 provides data description. Section 3 provides our empirical 
methodology and discusses the results. Finally, section 4 summarizes. 
2. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Data used for our explanatory variable - „„Culture‟ comes from the integrated data set of World 
Values Survey and European
4
 Values Survey (WVS and EVS).    These surveys capture culture 
in the form of individual beliefs and values reflecting local norms and customs. Tabellini
5
 (2008) 
has identified some important traits in an attempt to capture the multiple aspects of informal 
institutions such as norms, conventions, grass-roots institutions and trust. These four important 
traits are trust, respect, control, and obedience and have been to create an aggregate index. It is 
constructed by summing Trust, Control, and Respect and subtracting the Obedience score. The 
detailed description is provided in the Appendix 2.  
The primary dependent variable in this study is Financial Development. Data on financial 
development is taken from the Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) database.  We use 
several indicators of financial development to establish robustness of our findings. The measures 
used are liquid liabilities over GDP, private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, private credit 
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP and life insurance volume over 
GDP. Further, we also use stock market measures - Stock market total value traded to GDP and 
stock market turnover ratio.  The controls used are GDP, GDP growth, a proxy of formal 
institution, polity2, trade openness, Inflation (GDP deflator) and legal origin dummies.  
                                                          
4
 The WVS has been implemented in five
4
 waves so far: (i) 1981-84, (ii) 1990-93, (iii) 1995-97,  (iv) 1999-2002and 
(v) 2005-2008. The fifth wave of this value survey covers countries that together account for about 85 per cent of the 
world‟s population. 
5
 In recent decades, investigating empirical links of culture with other variables has been made possible by the 
important variables identified by Tabellini   
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3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS  
A. Benchmark Results 
As stated earlier, we consider cross sectional specifications which consider long term changes 
and, thus, are an appropriate starting model for our hypothesis testing. Our benchmark 
specification is as follows 
                           
where the dependent variable,     denotes financial development in country  . The independent 
variable,        , represents informal institutions or culture of country  .   denotes the matrix 
of control variables (in lagged form) for country   and    denotes the random error term for the 
same. For all the proxies of financial development, we consider 2008 values for our benchmark 
specifications. We consider average values of all the controls over the period 1980 to 2007. This 
helps us to avoid any endogeneity concern to a significant extent.  
We empirically test our hypothesis using quantile regression estimation technique. In the 
presence of outliers, ordinary least square estimates can be distorted. When there are outliers 
present, Koenker and Bassett (1978) suggested quantile regression methodology which considers 
asymmetrically weighted absolute residuals of the median rather than the mean of the 
distribution and generates efficient estimators. Quantile regressions are non-parametric and, thus, 
assume no underlying distribution. We have 90 countries in our sample.  
 Table 1 and 2 lists the top ten and bottom ten countries in our sample in terms of their 
culture score as well as on the basis of two different proxies of financial development.  For Table 
1, Anglo –Saxon countries and Northern European countries tend to feature in both the lists. 
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Similarly, in Table 2 Sub-Saharan African countries unsurprisingly feature in both the lists. 
Appendix 1 provides the correlation matrix for the benchmark variables along with the 
significance level of 1%. 
Table 3 presents our benchmark results. For the several proxies of financial development, 
the coefficient of culture is positive and significant at 5% level.  We also control for several 
macroeconomic indicators like trade openness, inflation, GDP at constant process, and GDP 
growth. In addition, we add controls for political institutions (from Polity 2) and legal origin 
dummies as well. Legal origin dummies have the strongest impact on financial development.  
In order to ensure, the robustness of our cultural measurement we further consider an 
alternate proxy of culture – the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI).  Hofstede's "dimensions of 
culture" are derived mainly from his book Cultural Consequences (2001) – the scores are general 
comparisons of values in the countries and regions he studied and can vary greatly within each 
country. In present paper, we introduce one of his social dimensions: „Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index‟6. A high uncertainty avoidance ranking indicates the country has a low tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity. This creates a rule-oriented society that institutes laws, rules, 
regulations, and controls in order to reduce the amount of uncertainty. Conversely, a low 
uncertainty avoidance ranking indicates the country has less concern about ambiguity and 
uncertainty and has more tolerance for a diversity of opinions. This is reflected in a society that 
is less rule-oriented, more readily accepts change, and takes more and greater.  The index values 
range from 8 (Singapore) to 112 (Greece). Since uncertainty avoidance can be viewed as an 
obstacle to entrepreneurship and inventive activity, a negative correlation between UAI and 
                                                          
6
 The UAI was calculated from three questions from the survey questionnaire: (1) the  feeling  that  company  rules  
should  not be broken,  not  even when the  employee  thinks  it would be  in  the  company's  best interests  to  do 
so; (2)  the  respondent's  intention  to  stay  with  the company for more than  five  years;  and (3)  the respondent‟s 
feelings  of stress  at work. 
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financial development should be expected. We reported our findings in Table 4.  Indeed, the 
coefficient of UA index is negative and significant at 10% level for column 2 and column 3 in 
the Table.  
B. Robustness 
So far, the specifications have considered normal standard errors. Both asymptotic and 
bootstrapping methods generate standard errors and confidence intervals of coefficient estimates 
of quantile regressions. Hao and Naiman (2007)   establish that the bootstrapping method is more 
preferred and hence we check our results with bootstrapped standard errors. The results remain 
robust for all the different proxies of financial development. Further, we consider simultaneous 
quantile regressions which allow us to have the results for all the quantiles simultaneously. 
While the coefficient of culture is significant for all quantiles, the impact is stronger for countries 
with higher levels of financial development than lower levels of financial development.  
In order to take care of endogeneity, we considered lagged controls. Yet, to add 
robustness to our findings and to be able to claim causation strongly, we run IV regressions. The 
results show that coefficient of culture is significant for all measures except stock market 
proxies. The instruments used are percentages of Catholic and Muslim population individually 
and lagged average ethnic diversity. The first stage results show that F (= 4.8) statistic is above 
conventional level. The partial R square of excluded instruments is 0.26. Sargan and Basmann 
tests confirm that the over identification tests are satisfied and, thus, our instruments are 
efficient.  
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4. CONCLUSION 
We add to the extant literature in two ways. First, our results reveal that while economic and 
political factors are important for a country‟s financial development, culture also has a 
significant impact. Various traits of a society, which compositely consist of culture, influence 
different proxies of financial development.  Second, we establish a link between Hofstede‟s 
anthropological culture study and the finance literature, suggesting an interdisciplinary 
explanation of the heterogeneous nature of financial systems across countries. We confirm that 
financial development of a country is strongly correlated with uncertainty avoidance, a 
dimension of national culture featured in Hofstede‟s analysis. 
 However, the related literature that connects culture with different macroeconomic 
indicators is still in its infancy. Many interesting analysis can be carried out - incorporate culture 
in an endogenous growth model and test specific relationships in a systematic empirical way, 
investigate the financial development-culture association with micro data and so on. Integrating 
culture in the research agenda of political economics is a priority. We sincerely hope this 
analysis will stimulate further investigation along these lines. 
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Table 1: Top ten countries: Culture and Financial Development Score 
 
Country 
 
Culture 
(Aggregate) 
 
Country 
 
Private Credit by 
Deposit Money 
Banks / GDP 
 
 
Liquid 
Liabilities/ 
GDP 
 
Sweden 9.19 Ireland  2.097488 1.010711 
Finland 7.92 Netherlands 1.931102 1.285513 
New Zealand 7.86 United Kingdom 1.889618 1.527658 
Switzerland 7.52 Spain 1.884944 1.4489 
Canada 6.78 Switzerland 1.74539 1.417641 
Australia 6.62 New Zealand 1.481596 1.020509 
Netherlands 6.57 Canada 1.298429 1.146417 
Germany 6.22 Hong Kong 1.266427 2.959522 
United States 6.13 Sweden 1.235083 0.557046 
Japan 6.03 Australia 1.210288 1.021344 
 
Table 2: Bottom ten countries: Culture and Financial Development Score 
 
Country 
 
Culture 
(Aggregate) 
 
Country 
 
Private Credit 
by Deposit 
Money Banks 
/ GDP 
 
 
Liquid 
Liabilities/ 
GDP 
 
Uganda 0.57 Burkina Faso 0.216172 0.155479 
Burkina Faso 1.12 Armenia 0.220937 0.141256 
Zambia 1.3 Uganda 0.228278 0.093294 
Algeria 1.44 Dominican Republic 0.231021 0.193026 
Pakistan 1.93 Georgia 0.236631 0.312385 
Mali 1.94 Nigeria 0.24114 0.245199 
Nigeria 2.02 Zambia 0.243345 0.135757 
Morocco 2.05 Mexico 0.258562 0.192303 
Philippines 2.06 Mali 0.269416 0.161676 
El Salvador 2.07 Colombia 0.273051 0.41904 
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Table 3: Quantile Regressions: Impact of Culture on Financial Development 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Liquid 
liabilities  
Private 
credit by 
deposit 
money 
banks 
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks and other 
financial 
institutions 
Stock market 
capitalization 
Stock market 
total value 
traded 
      
Culture 0.0751** 0.178*** 0.170*** 0.178*** 0.270* 
 (0.0307) (0.0232) (0.0303) (0.0647) (0.164) 
GDP in billions (constant PPP) 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
GDP growth 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.12* 0.08 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.18) 
Inflation -0.0001* -0.001*** -0.001** 0.002* -0.0004 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Trade 0.002** 0.001 0.001* 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.007) 
Polity 0.001 0.01** 0.01* 0.01 0.07 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) 
Legal Origins Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant -0.0171 -0.206 -0.263 -0.723* -1.140 
 (0.193) (0.143) (0.182) (0.408) (1.285) 
      
Observations 67 70 70 60 44 
Pseudo R-sq 0.23 0.42 0.44 0.18 0.32 
 
Note: 1)Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     *2) The coefficient of UA index in column (5) is weakly significant (p= 0.11) 
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Table 4: Quantile Regressions: With the UA Index 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Private credit by 
deposit money banks* 
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks and other 
financial 
institutions 
Stock market 
capitalization  
 
    
U A index -0.00786 -0.00819* -0.00816* 
 (0.00522) (0.00460) (0.00431) 
GDP in billions (constant PPP) 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
GDP growth 0.00927 -0.0158 0.149*** 
 (0.0591) (0.0521) (0.0464) 
Inflation -0.000958 -0.000796 0.00118* 
 (0.000794) (0.000693) (0.000619) 
Trade 0.000660 0.00124 0.00125 
 (0.000952) (0.00135) (0.000782) 
Polity 0.0826*** 0.0738*** 0.0807*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0152) (0.0139) 
Legal Origins Yes  Yes Yes 
    
Constant 0.771* 0.882** 0.372 
 (0.413) (0.366) (0.318) 
    
Observations 49 49 48 
 
Note: 1) Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     *2) The coefficient of UA index in column (1) is weakly significant (p= 0.11) 
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Appendix 1: Correlation Matrix 
 
FD1 FD2 FD3 Culture  GDP 
GDP 
growth Inflation Trade Polity 
FD1 1.00 0.94* 0.67* 0.62* 0.09 0.11 -0.28 0.30* 0.53* 
FD2 0.94* 1 
 
0.62*  0.32*   0.09 -0.28 0.25 0.54*   
FD3 0.67* 0.63*  1  0.33* 0.14 0.24 -0.23 0.48* 0.23 
Culture  0.62* 0.62*   0.33* 1 0.247 -0.09 -0.15 0.09 0.52*   
GDP 0.09 0.32*   0.14 0.247 1 -0.04 -0.09 -0.2 0.22 
GDP growth 0.11 0.09 0.24 -0.09 -0.04 1 -0.28 0.1688 -0.36 
Inflation -0.28 -0.28 -0.23 -0.15 -0.09 -0.28 1 -0.05 -0.04 
Trade 0.30* 0.25 0.48* 0.09 -0.2 0.1688 -0.05 1 -0.03 
Polity 0.53* 0.54*   0.23 0.52*   0.22 -0.36 -0.04 -0.03 1 
 
Note:  1) FD1 – Private Credit to Deposit Money Banks; FD2 - Private Credit to Deposit Money Banks and other 
institutions  
2) * implies significant at 1% level 
 
Appendix 2: Description of Culture 
Culture: 
Trust, the first cultural attribute, aims to capture the level of trust among individuals. The following 
question from the survey is used to measure this attribute: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can‟t be too careful in dealing with people?” The percentage of 
respondents that answered “Most people can be trusted,” has been used to capture the level or degree of 
trust in each country.  
The second component which is considered from WVS and EVS is control. The question used to 
capture this trait is: “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while 
other people feel that what we do has no real effect on what happens to them.  Please use this scale (from 
1 to 10) where 1 means “none at all” and 10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of 
choice and control in life you have over the way your life turns out”. By averaging all the individual 
responses and multiplying them by 10, an aggregate control component is determined.  
The third cultural trait, respect, proxies for the level of generalized versus limited morality. The 
following question is used to decide the importance of respect in a society: “Here is a list of qualities that 
children can be encouraged to learn at home.  Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?  
Please choose up to five”.  Respect is defined as the percentage of respondents in each country that 
mentioned the quality “tolerance and respect for other people,” as being important. Obedience is the 
fourth and final trait and the question measuring respect is also utilized in capturing the level of obedience 
in a society. It is measured as the percentage of respondents within a country answering that obedience is 
an important quality for children to learn. 
